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Abstract: What motivates authoritarian regimes to crack down on corruption? We argue that just 
as partisan competition in democracies tends to politicize corruption, authoritarian leaders may 
exploit anticorruption campaigns to target rival supporters during internal power struggles for 
consolidating their power base. We apply this theoretical framework to provincial leadership 
turnover in China and test it using an anticorruption data set. We find that intraelite power 
competition, captured by the informal power configuration of government incumbents and their 
predecessors, can increase investigations of corrupt senior officials by up to 20%. The intensity 
of anticorruption propaganda exhibits a similar pattern. The findings indicate that informal 
politics can propel strong anticorruption drives in countries without democratically-accountable 
institutions, although the drives tend to be selective, arbitrary, and factionally biased.  
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Introduction 
          Corruption, defined as the abuse of public office for private gain (Nye, 1967), undermines 
the economy and regime legitimacy (Seligson, 2002). High-quality institutions for political and 
economic competitiveness (Treisman, 2007), such as liberal democracies (Montinola & Jackman, 
2002; Rose-Ackerman, 1999), media supervision (Brunetti & Weder, 2003), and market 
competition (Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Aidt, 2009; Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000), are often credited 
with reinforcing state officials’ incentives to combat corruption. By contrast, nondemocratic 
countries without accountable institutions are expected to be weak in corruption control. 
Nevertheless, rather than a perennially condoning attitude, authoritarian governments may 
periodically wage wars on corruption. For instance, Rwanda and South Korea strengthened 
anticorruption institutions and experienced reduced corruption when becoming more autocratic 
(Hollyer & Wantchekon, 2015). Indonesia launched several attempts to eradicate corruption 
under Suharto’s regime (Quah, 1999). China is another notable authoritarian country with 
periodic anticorruption campaigns featuring intense investigations against corrupt officials 
(Manion, 2004; Wedeman, 2005). Therefore, the questions are, why and when do authoritarian 
regimes strike harder at corruption? What mechanisms drive the dynamics of anticorruption 
activity in countries with weak or absent democratic and institutional accountability? 
          Without institutional guarantees to curb corruption, temporary anticorruption campaigns in 
authoritarian states may be a political response to stimuli external to the ruling clique such as 
extreme public dissatisfaction with corrupt officials, a decline of social control instruments (e.g., 
ideological indoctrination), and political developments in other countries (Gillespie & Okruhlik, 
1991; Hollyer & Wantchekon, 2015). A prerequisite for these stimuli is a benevolent incumbent 
concerned with public support and the long-term survival of the regime (Chang & Golden, 2010; 
Rose, Mishler, & Munro, 2011). However, a popular revolt remains a secondary concern for 
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rulers, whose primary concern is managing relations with the ruling allies (Svolik, 2012). While 
condoning corruption enables authoritarian leaders to buy loyalty from their inner circles (Bueno 
de Mesquite et al., 2003), anticorruption campaigns can also be used to purge political rivals.  
 We contend that the intensity of intraelite power competition is a major force within the 
ruling clique driving the anticorruption dynamics in authoritarian states. When political 
competition is intense, leaders tend to pursue anticorruption campaigns to eliminate their rivals. 
By contrast, leaders tend to tolerate corruption when competition is less intense. This cycle is 
similar to the politicization of corruption in democracies, where it is used to discredit opponents 
during elections. While such politicization mainly occurs between political parties in 
democracies, informal power networks and coalitions are often the primary targets of 
anticorruption drives in authoritarian regimes. Leaders investigate corruption in their competitors’ 
networks to weaken their rivals and thereby consolidate their hold on power. We conceptualize 
this logic as the politicization of anticorruption in authoritarian regimes. 
 In the subnational politics of leadership turnovers in China, former leaders of a 
jurisdiction may continue to influence local politics through their personal networks in the 
government because of the prevalence of informal politics (Huang, 2000). This political legacy 
can hinder the incumbents’ power consolidation and political advancement. In response, the 
incumbents may investigate previous incidents of corruption to uproot predecessors’ networks. 
We hypothesize that anticorruption activity tends to be the most intense when power transitions 
occur between leaders who are clients of strong patrons competing in the party center. With the 
patronage of senior party leaders, local incumbents have the greatest incentive and capacity to 
politicize anticorruption for weakening the local political networks of their powerful 
predecessors. By contrast, in other types of leadership turnovers, power conflicts between 
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predecessors and incumbents are less intense and anticorruption investigations are fewer because 
either the incumbents cannot launch effective anticorruption drives against the preexisting 
political networks or they tolerate the corruption to gain support.  
 We test our hypothesis by examining the variation of anticorruption endeavors among 
Chinese provincial governments. We use the number of officials at and above the 
county/division levels (xian chu ji) investigated annually by the provincial procuratorates 
between 1996 and 2012 as a proxy for the provincial governments’ anticorruption intensity. 
Large numbers are considered strong attacks on corruption. We code provincial officials’ 
factional ties to identify the types of power transition at the provincial level. Using fixed effect 
models, we focus on variations within provinces and estimate the effects of different power 
transition types on anticorruption endeavors while controlling for a rich set of provincial and 
leaders’ personal characteristics. We find that power transitions between leaders supported by 
strong patrons competing in the party center increase the number of officials investigated 
annually for corruption by 13–17 (15%–20% relative to the mean). Moreover, we find similar 
patterns in government anticorruption propaganda, measured using the number of anticorruption 
articles in local party newspapers, further lending credence to our theoretical arguments.  
 Our research advances existing literature in several directions. First, while the extant 
scholarship is preoccupied with understanding the causes of corruption and the role of formal 
institutions in curbing corruption, our study investigates the influence of informal political 
networks and politicians’ concerns with political survival on anticorruption endeavors in 
authoritarian regimes. Second, current literature on authoritarianism emphasizes the role of elite 
unity and power-sharing in sustaining authoritarianism (Brownlee, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; 
Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2012), whereas our findings suggest that elite cleavage may potentially 
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deter unbridled corruption. Finally, in addition to socioeconomic achievements in 
interjurisdictional competition (Guo, 2009; Lu & Landry, 2014) and political connections to the 
top leadership (Shih, Adolph, & Liu, 2012), we contend that the ability to dismantle rival power 
networks and consolidate the ruling coalition contributes to the career advancement of Chinese 
political leaders.  
Elite Power Competition and Politicizing Anticorruption in One-Party Regimes 
          While political competition in electoral democracies discourages officials from engaging 
in corruption, intense competition among multiple parties can encourage politicization of 
corruption to win votes. In Europe, political parties during parliamentary elections have 
increasingly accused their opponents of being corrupt, because the narrowing ideological gap 
between political parties renders them increasingly indistinguishable to voters (Bågenholm, 
2010). In the United States, politically appointed attorneys in the Department of Justice may 
have a partisan bias when prosecuting corruption cases. Public officials from Democratic 
localities were reported to be disproportionately targeted under Reagan, Nixon, and Ford 
(Gordon, 2009; Meier & Holbrook, 1992). Politicians accused for corruption, regardless proven 
or merely alleged, can lose an election or career prospects (Peters & Welch, 1980; Welch & 
Hibbing, 1997). Power competition among authoritarian political elites can also stimulate 
politicization of anticorruption investigations.  
Although genuine elections are absent in authoritarian regimes, leaders still compete over 
political positions and privileges at the national and local levels. Authoritarian leaders inherently 
rely on the loyalty of a group of allies (Tullock, 1987). Competing elites often have a coterie of 
second-rank leaders as supporters, leading to factions or vertical divisions within the collective 
leadership (Taras, 1989). Consequently, in centralized regimes, such as one-party dictatorships, 
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factions substitute parties. Factional infighting functions as political competition for both senior 
elites and lower-level officials in the party (Ionescu & de Madariaga, 1968). For example, in 
Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party–dominated political system, party factionalism was 
characterized by “protracted leadership competition” with “major rounds of bargaining” (Ezrow 
& Frantz, 2011, p. 199). In communist states, without institutional guarantees of power transition, 
previously designated successors may be marginalized by competing factions (Taras, 1989).  
          Thus, in authoritarian regimes, particularly one-party regimes, political success lies in the 
strength of coalitions or networks of loyal supporters, which are as vital to authoritarian leaders 
as votes are to political candidates in democracies (Bueno de Mesquite et al., 2003). Nationally, 
a looming opposition coalition can threaten authoritarian leaders’ rule. Regionally, any power 
network disloyal to local administrators may become a liability in their policy implementation 
and political advancement, especially when the network is associated with their political rivals.  
 When competition intensifies, authoritarian leaders could terrorize or eliminate opponents 
“through murder, show trials, torture, and purges” (Haber, 2006, p. 698), such as Stalin’s purges 
of the Soviet Communist Party and the Red Army, and Saddam Hussein’s purges of Iraq’s Arab 
Socialist Ba’ath Party. However, deploying such terror entails extremely high stakes, because the 
leaders risk being eliminated by their rivals if they fail to attain the upper hand, and such terror 
may foment distrust and indiscriminate violence, undermining the functionality of the 
government (Haber, 2006; Tullock, 1987).  To mitigate the dangers of elite competition, many 
authoritarian regimes have embraced adaptive institutions, such as elections and open legislative 
contestations (Magaloni, 2006; Gandhi & Przeworski 2007; Levitsky & Way 2010; Malesky & 
Schuler 2010). Political elites (and lower-level officials) obtain an institutional venue to compete 
for power, patronage, and distribution of state resources (Lust-Okar, 2006). Party institutions in 
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one-party regimes also facilitate power sharing between the dictator and ruling coalition by 
forming credible and intertemporal power-sharing deals with potential opponents (Magaloni, 
2008; Svolik, 2012). Thus, such adaptive institutions enable authoritarian leaders to manage the 
expectations of elites, reconcile competition, and deter defection. 
 With institutional adaptation, politicization of corruption becomes one of the viable 
means for weakening rivals. Fighting corruption facilitates legitimizing the regime’s seizure of 
power and establishing a complete system of support from different factions by intimidating 
contending elites with legal pretexts (Heidenheimer & Johnston 2009). Corruption cleanups may 
occasionally develop into high-level purges of the ruling party, usually shortly after revolutions 
and coups, when authoritarian leaders are eager to delegitimize the preceding regime and win 
public support (Gillespie & Okruhlik 1991). However, after adaptive institutions are established, 
resorting to large-scale purging undermines the credibility of the power-sharing deal and forces 
ruling elites to the opposition coalition. Thus, upholding “the power-sharing arrangement with 
his ruling clique to make his life less vulnerable” (Magaloni, 2008, p. 10) is in a dictator’s 
interest. When launching anticorruption campaigns, authoritarian rulers are cautious to restrain 
them from escalating into indiscriminate purges. 
 To avoid acknowledging widespread corruption and discrediting the entire regime, 
authoritarian leaders tend to target major political opponents and selectively investigate scandals 
of clearly identified wrongdoers (Gillespie & Okruhlik, 1991). In contrast with democracies, 
which have open contestation among multiple parties, single-party authoritarian regimes do not 
openly tolerate the emergence of intraparty conflicts; they “hide any appearance of internal splits 
from the public eye so as to project an aura of party invulnerability” (Ezrow & Frantz, 2011, p. 
199). In addition, competing politicians are discouraged from defecting from the party because 
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an elite split may result in the loss of power over the regime (Geddes, 2003). Therefore, unlike 
democracies, politicization of anticorruption often does not directly target a dictator’s competitor; 
instead, it targets the competitor’s network of supporters, usually mid- to low-level officials, 
because they are a more vulnerable and safer target with regard to regime stability. In addition, 
because the ultimate objective is to remain in power, when competition is less intense, 
authoritarian political elites may tolerate corruption to co-opt potential challengers.  
 Therefore, the primary force politicizing anticorruption in one-party authoritarian regimes 
is the intensity of power competition among ruling elites. With the ultimate goal of remaining in 
power through the ruling party, political elites tend to employ this strategy against their major 
rivals, and they target supporters who form the political networks of competing political elites in 
the ruling party. 
Anticorruption amid Intraelite Competition in China 
         Since the economic reforms, corruption in China has grown tremendously with increasing 
sophistication and involvement of larger funds and high-level officials (Gong, 1997; Guo, 2008; 
Wedeman, 2004), and the state has arduously fought this problem. The Central Discipline 
Inspection Committee (CDIC) and its local Discipline Inspection Committees (DICs) in the party 
are the primary anticorruption organizations, supplemented by the Ministry of Supervision and 
the procuratorate. The DICs enforce party disciplines, monitor and punish corruption and various 
wrongdoings of party members (Guo, 2014). They are the first to investigate a case and decide 
whether to refer it to the procuratorate for further investigation. The state has implemented 
routine anticorruption measures, such as audits of the government official departures and 
performance reviews of the disciplinary departments. Furthermore, the party center combines 
regular “police patrols” with campaign-style enforcement to temporarily crackdown on 
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corruption, resulting in short-term increases in investigations and prosecutions for corruption 
(Wedeman, 2005).  
 Nonetheless, the intensity of anticorruption investigations at the local level is largely 
influenced by the party leaders at various administrative levels. Theoretically, local DICs can 
supervise any official under their authority. However, they are subject to the leadership of local 
party committees, which substantially control DIC officials’ salaries, benefits, and promotions. 
Within the party committees, party secretaries are usually the most influential. Moreover, the 
heavily politicized judicial system facilitates party leaders’ control over the court (Pei, 2006). If 
local party secretaries choose to tolerate corruption in their jurisdiction, corrupt officials may 
circumvent DIC investigations and legal ramifications (Guo, 2014). During the short bursts of 
aggressive enforcement, local party secretaries have even more latitude in deciding the timing, 
intensity, and targets of investigations. Thus, local party secretaries often possess the 
fundamental decision-making power to condone or condemn corruption among their 
subordinates (Manion, 2004). Although the CDIC has strengthened the vertical leadership over 
its local branches since 2004, it is almost impossible for the central and local DICs to 
independently investigate a case without the support of the powerful local party leaders. In 
addition, the CDIC has approximately 2,000 employees distributed over 27 internal departments, 
among which only 10 offices specialize in discipline inspection and supervision (Guo, 2014). 
Every month, the CDIC receives thousands of corruption reports including personal visits, letters, 
phone calls, and online reports1; it is thus understaffed and can primarily focus only on cases 
involving high-level officials, leaving anticorruption efforts targeting leaders at and below the 
prefectural level to the local DICs. Therefore, local party secretaries’ preferences and incentives 
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in combating corruption substantially affect local anticorruption endeavors. Their leadership over 
anticorruption activities further affords them opportunities to politicize anticorruption.  
            Similar to other one-party regimes, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a long 
history of infighting among party leaders. Pursuing career security and advancement, many 
political elites form informal groups on the basis of personal ties (Nathan, 1973; Pye, 1981).  
Factions constantly jockey for dominance within the party, especially during national and local 
leadership transitions. The dominant factional networks may launch large-scale campaigns to 
consolidate power at the expense of the dominated networks (Huang, 2000). Historically, intense 
factional infighting led to irrational purges and vicious struggles for succession until the late 
1980s. Recent emphasis on procedural rules, such as norm-bound succession politics and term 
and age limits for retirement, has restrained factional competition from deteriorating into endless 
power struggles and has reinforced within the leadership the feeling that removal should arise 
from just causes (Li, 2012a; Nathan, 2003; Teiwes, 1984). Thus, corruption investigations have 
become a widely adopted means, among others, for resolving intraelite competition because such 
investigations require evidence and follow relatively public legal proceedings to eliminate 
officials, while appealing to public demand for a clean government.  
 During anticorruption campaigns, factions play a role similar to that of political parties in 
democracies in differentiating politicians’ political competitiveness and power affiliations. 
Competitive officials are often affiliated with strong factions led by powerful patrons, such as 
Long Marchers and members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo (PSC) in the central 
government. For example, in the early reform years, Deng Xiaoping and his followers were a 
dominant force, but they occasionally faced strong opposition from conservatives, led by other 
party elders such as Chen Yun (Shih, 2008a). From the mid to late 1990s, officials networked 
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around Party Secretary General Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng, and Chairman of the National 
People’s Congress Qiao Shi, all of whom competed for party dominance (Fewsmith, 2001). 
Since the late 1990s, the “elitist coalition” and the “populist coalition” have risen. The elitist 
coalition is loosely constituted by princelings—leaders whose parents are either veteran 
revolutionaries or high-ranking officials—and the Shanghai Gang—Jiang Zemin’s protégés in 
Shanghai. The populist coalition was led by former president Hu Jintao and a core group of the 
so-called Tuanpai—leaders who advanced their political career primarily through working in the 
Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) (Li, 2013). Many members of these two coalitions 
became key provincial leaders and members of the PSC and Politburo. However, not all officials 
participated in factional competition and some were merely members of local power groups. 
Without a powerful central patron for essential support, these officials can be considered 
factionless or belonging to weak factions. Official appointments during leadership turnovers 
often result from complex bargaining, trading, and compromising processes between different 
factions and central leaders (Li, 2012b). 2 Power transitions between the outgoing provincial 
party secretaries and their successors can be generally categorized into five types according to 
the leaders’ factional affiliations (Figure 1).  
[Figure 1 about here] 
           We argue that the tendency to politicize anticorruption is the strongest in Type I 
(strong/strong-contender) power transitions. Because of factionalism, relinquishing a position, 
irrespective of the reason (rotation, retirement, or even subversion), does not necessarily imply 
that the leader’s local influence has evaporated. As long as the leader’s factional networks persist, 
he or she may have a substantial influence on local affairs (Huang, 2000). Predecessors from 
strong factions may have more opportunities for promotion to positions that are more 
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authoritative, and their powerful patrons in the central government may lend them more political 
capital to maintain wide networks. These advantages can prompt the predecessors’ local 
followers to remain loyal even after the predecessors relinquish their positions.3  
 However, loyalty to a predecessor is often a threat to an incumbent from another faction. 
The patron–client network inherently suffers from the commitment problem. If followers want to 
continue receiving benefits from their patrons, such as promotions and subsidies, they must gain 
their patrons’ trust by credibly demonstrating loyalty such as by constantly rendering payoffs 
(e.g., profitable projects) to their patrons and through public displays of obsequiousness (Shih, 
2008b). However, local officials loyal to the predecessor may be less cooperative with the 
incumbent. Local officials who are under the protection of the powerful predecessor and 
involved in collective corruption through a network of departments, businesspeople, and even 
organized crime groups (Gong, 2002) are particularly self-protective and unwilling to share local 
tribute with a new leader. The new leader thus faces obstacles in building his or her own local 
power coalition and implementing an agenda that appeals to his or her patrons. Thus, new 
provincial secretaries, similar to partisan prosecutors in democracies, may be motivated by 
factional biases when investigating corruption cases that occurred under their predecessors. The 
secretaries can subsequently replace the purged local officials with their loyalists to strengthen 
their power base. Moreover, in Type I power transitions, the predecessor and incumbent are 
more likely to be in competition, because clients of powerful central patrons tend to be promising 
political stars (Shih et al., 2012). Arresting corrupt officials promoted by predecessors might 
reflect predecessors’ problem in managing local cadres and offer the incumbents’ central patron 
a pretext for blocking further promoting the predecessors.  
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A prominent example involves Wang Yang, a well-known member of the CCYL faction, 
and Bo Xilai, a member of the princeling class. After Wang Yang’s promotion as the party 
secretary of Guangdong Province in 2007, Bo Xilai (son of Bo Yibo, a revolutionary belonging 
to Deng Xiaoping’s inner circle in the 1980s) succeeded Wang as the party secretary of 
Chongqing.4 Both Wang and Bo were widely considered major contenders for seats in the PSC 
during the 18th Party Congress. Bo’s campaign against organized crime and corruption in 
Chongqing was widely suspected of being a political move to cripple his predecessors’ local 
network and discredit Wang, who he deemed his major rival (Fewsmith, 2010; Wedeman, 2012).  
 In the aforementioned scenarios, predecessors may step out to protect their former 
followers. However, such protection can be costly, often requiring exchange for withdrawing 
power competition or arousing suspicion of corruption of the protectors. 5  Thus, protection 
presumably is stingily offered only to those extremely crucial followers of the predecessors. 
Type I power transitions in general substantially motivate politicization of anticorruption and 
precipitate the prosecution of local corruption cases, leading to irregular peaks in anticorruption 
enforcement. Such motivations are much weaker in other transition types. When the predecessor 
and the incumbent belong to the same faction (Type II), to guard factional interests and avoid 
arousing suspicions against their shared patron, the incumbent has less motivation to uncover 
corruption under his or her predecessor. In Type IV power transitions, when the predecessor 
belongs to no faction or a weak faction and the incumbent is from a strong faction, the incumbent 
has a weaker need to undermine existing local power networks through corruption prosecution. 
Local officials who receive little protection from their former leaders are easily to be co-opted by 
powerful incumbents to obtain benefits and avoid trouble. Even if the predecessor is entrenched 
in the locality, for example, provincial officials who rise from the grassroots to the provincial 
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government through decades of promotions, bargaining for certain deals between the incumbent 
and the predecessor’s loyalists is still relatively easy. The incumbent can govern without strong 
opposition from the preexisting local network as long as the loyalists lack a central patron. As 
Shirk (1993) observed, when officials are aware that their superiors can at will charge them with 
corruption, the lack of charges effectively becomes a benefit for which the officials gratefully 
exchange their political support. Thus, tolerating local corruption may help the incumbent win 
more local allies. In Type III and V power transitions, incumbents from weak factions may lack 
the capacity to pursue corrupt officials affiliated with extensive local networks.  
 In general, elite power competition can lead to politicization of anticorruption in China as 
in electoral democracies. We hypothesize that this tendency is the strongest during power 
transitions between politicians from different strong factions competing for party dominance and 
weaker in other types of power transitions. Therefore, selective toleration and prosecution of 
corruption is substantially influenced by the enduring intraelite infighting in China. This 
framework explains the temporal ebb and flow of anticorruption campaigns within a locality.  
Empirical Strategy 
Data and Variables 
           To measure the dependent variable—local governments’ anticorruption efforts—we use 
the number of officials at and above county/division levels in China investigated by the 
provincial procuratorates between 1996 and 2012.6 Figures 2A and 2B illustrate the fluctuation 
in the number of investigated officials in all 31 provincial units during the aforementioned period. 
Although the fluctuations may stem from changes in both actual corruption and anticorruption 
efforts, there are several reasons to consider that the variations largely reflect fluctuations in 
local anticorruption efforts. First, party leaders usually interpret increased enforcement figures as 
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political achievements and stronger commitment to anticorruption (Manion, 2004). In addition, 
scholars have identified in China a long time lag from the year officials were first involved in 
corruption to the year that they were found to be corrupt. On average, this crime–capture lag 
ranges from five to eight years since the 1990s (Guo, 2008). Therefore, what the anticorruption 
campaigns revealed are predominantly corrupt acts committed by officials several years ago. 
Given the rampant corruption in China, most provinces would likely have accumulated high 
levels of hidden corruption (Wedeman 2012). Moreover, corruption in China is broadly defined, 
including cases involving illicit monies as low as RMB5000 and moral misconduct such as 
dishonesty and adultery (Ko and Wong 2012). This conceptual ambiguity offers sufficient room 
to charge an official for being corrupt. Therefore, even a marginal and temporary decrease (or 
increase) in corruption might not fundamentally inhibit (or facilitate) the ability of local 
anticorruption agencies to investigate scores of officials from a large pool of corrupt officials 
when they launch an anticorruption campaign. However, we are aware that the aforementioned 
justifications require some strong assumptions. In the empirical tests, we relax the assumption on 
the level of corruption and carefully control for proxies of actual corruption and direct measures 
of corruption to eliminate fluctuations caused by changes in corruption, as elaborated 
subsequently.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
           Our key independent variable is a dummy variable characterizing the type of power 
transitions. We first identify factional ties of the provincial party secretaries in our data set. Shih 
et al. (2012) provided a political biographical data set of Central Committee members from the 
first party congress in 1921 to the sixteenth party congress in 2002. This data set records not only 
leaders’ demographic information of birth year, gender, year of induction into the party, 
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education, ethnicity, and princeling status, but also every state, party, and military position held 
by them throughout their careers. We extend the data of provincial secretaries in this data set to 
2012. In the seminal research on Chinese bureaucracy, Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) reported 
that bonds of guanxi arise among officials having family connections, common geographical 
origins, shared education, work, or military experience. Based on this finding, Shih et al. (2012) 
assumed that factional ties occur between officials and top leaders who share birthplaces, 
educational institutions, and work units. We follow this approach to code factional ties between 
provincial secretaries and powerful patrons in the party center.7 Leaders having ties with serving 
or retired PSC members are considered members of strong factions. Each princeling is also 
treated as an independent strong faction, because their exceptional backgrounds tend to provide 
abundant political capital and allow them to be leaders in their own right. Princelings suffer from 
low cohesion because of their complex personal interactions, lack of common corporate 
experience, and their parents’ past animosity and timeworn friendships (Bo, 2004; He and Gao, 
1992). Therefore, we code each princeling separately instead of as a coherent faction. All the 
remaining officials are considered politically weak. 8 Using information on leaders’ factional 
affiliations, we create five dichotomous variables to capture the possible factional combinations 
during power transitions. For instance, when testing the effect of the Type I power transitions, 
the dichotomous variable equals 1 when the predecessor and the incumbent belong to different 
strong factions and 0 for all other combinations. Figure 3 reveals that between 1996 and 2012, 
the different power transition types were relatively evenly distributed. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 We control for a rich set of confounding variables associated with the characteristics of 
provinces and individual party secretaries to minimize the omitted variable bias encountered in 
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observational studies. In particular, we control for the level of economic development, measured 
as the logarithm of per capita gross domestic product (GDP, deflated to constant price in 2000) 
and that of the number of government officials, because a large number of officials is likely to 
lead to an increase in the number of corrupt officials. Moreover, we control for the impact of 
actual corruption on the dependent variable by using two imperfect but arguably reasonable 
proxies. The first is government size, measured as the ratio of government spending to provincial 
GDP, because larger government spending has been found to strongly positively influence 
corruption (Goel & Nelson, 1998). The second proxy is the share of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in provincial GDP (i.e., SOE size), because it potentially gauges the degree of 
government intervention in the market economy, which is argued to be a major cause of 
corruption (Sun, 2004).  
             In addition, we control for a dummy variable, Big Case, to address the concern that the 
increased number of investigated officials may be driven by certain major cases (da yao an) 
inspected by the CDIC. In such scenarios, the party center rather than the local government 
targets high-ranking provincial leaders and their local followers. Big Case equals 1 when a 
province has vice-and-higher provincial-level officials investigated by the CDIC in a particular 
year, and 0 otherwise. We also include Big Case (t + 1) and Big Case (t + 2) in the model to 
denote one and two years following the big case, respectively, because big cases can increase 
local corruption investigation in subsequent years. In the robustness check, we further control for 
several personal characteristics of party secretaries, such as age, education, years of party 
membership, and local working experience, and a set of other variables that are detailed later. 
Table 1 summarizes our data and Table A1 (online appendix) reports the data sources and 
definitions. 
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[Table 1 about here] 
Model Specification 
        Given the relatively large scale of our dependent variable (mean = 83), we use linear 
regressions for major regressions and report in the appendix the results of the negative binominal 
model for a robustness check. In particular, we employ a fixed effect model, which enables us to 
focus on the within-province variations of anticorruption activity associated with the different 
types of power transitions. In addition, the fixed effect model enables us to eliminate 
unobservable time-invariant or slow-changing confounders. If we assume that the level of 
corruption changes very slowly in a province, a fixed effect model would be particularly useful 
for controlling for the effect of corruption level. Our baseline model specification is as follows:  
it it it i t ity Pα β η θ ε= + + + + +λX ,                 (1) 
           where i indexes province and t indexes year; ity  is our dependent variable, that is, the 
number of officials at and above county/division levels investigated by the provincial 
procuratorates; itP  is the dichotomous measure of a particular type of power transition (we 
primarily focus on Type I strong/strong-contender power transitions); itX  is a vector of temporal 
control variables introduced in the preceding section; α , β , and λ  are parameters to be 
estimated; iη  is the province fixed effect; tθ  is the year fixed effect parameter; and itε  is the 
error term.  
        Equation (1) estimates the average effect of a certain type of power transition on 
anticorruption endeavors. To further probe the precise timing of enhanced anticorruption efforts, 
we include lags and leads of power transition and employ a flexible specification:  
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,
[ 2,5 ], 0
it i it i t ity Pt t
t t
β η θ ε
∈ − + ≠
′= + + + +∑ λX ,                        (2) 
        where ,iP t′  is a set of dummy variables equaling 1 if t years have passed since the power 
transition. Here, [ 2,5 ]t ∈ − +  specifies the “event window” of power transition: 5+ and –2 
indicates more than five years after and two years before the event, respectively. If 1β−  and 2β−  
are insignificant, we have confidence that the estimates are not driven by the omitted temporal 
factors simultaneously causing power transition and anticorruption endeavors. Throughout, we 
report province-clustered standard errors to account for within-province correlations, including 
serial autocorrelation, in panel data.  
Estimation Results 
Baseline Results 
          The baseline results in Table 2 reveal striking patterns. Column (1) shows that without any 
control variables, the estimated coefficient for Type I power transitions is significant at 
conventional levels. Column (2) contains results obtained after controlling for the number of 
government officials (logged) and the per capita GDP (logged). We further control the two 
proxies for corruption in columns (3), and control for Big Case effects in column (4). The 
estimated results of strong/strong-contender power transition in columns (2)–(4) are robust. The 
two proxies of actual corruption are indistinguishable from zero in columns (3)–(4), indicating 
that anticorruption endeavors may be not a direct response to the degree of local corruption. 
Column (4) reveals that the effect of Big Case in the year of investigation is positive and 
significant at the 10% level. Clearly, an investigation of big cases can increase the number of 
investigated senior corrupt officials by nine. Yet, this effect diminishes and becomes 
insignificant in the two subsequent years. Our findings suggest that strong/strong-contender 
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power transition can on average significantly increase the number of investigated officials 
annually by 13–17, which, given that the average number of investigated officials in our sample 
is 83, is equivalent to an approximately 15%–20% increase relative to the mean.9 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
             To further test our hypothesis, we examine the effect of other types of power transitions 
on anticorruption investigations; Table 3 presents the results. Columns (1) and (2) show that 
when the incumbent and the predecessor belong to the same faction, the incumbent has less 
incentive to investigate many corrupt local officials; this is consistent with our hypothesis. 
Although this effect cannot be precisely estimated in column (1), it is significant when baseline 
controls are added in column (2). Moreover, columns (3)–(6) suggest that none of the estimated 
coefficients of the other types of power transitions are significant. These findings affirm our 
hypothesis: power competition between incumbents and predecessors rather than belonging to a 
strong faction per se motivates provincial leaders to investigate corrupt local officials. We also 
use “weak/weak” as the reference category and include the other four types in the model. The 
results are reported in Table A2.   
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Robustness Checks 
 
             We perform a series of regressions to test the robustness of our findings. In column (1) 
of Table 4, we exclude the four centrally-administered municipalities (i.e., Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai, and Chongqing) from our sample to preclude the possibility that our findings are 
driven by these large municipalities. In column (2), we remove Tibet and Xinjiang because the 
logic of anticorruption campaigns in these ethnic minority regions may diverge from the 
identified pattern. In column (3), we further narrow our sample to the Hu–Wen Administration 
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between 2002 and 2012 to test the pattern in the most recent years. In addition, we allow the time 
effects to differ across regions and control region–year fixed effects in column (4). 10 The results 
in columns (1)–(4) reveal that the effect of Type I power transitions remains robust and similar to 
the baseline findings. Column (5) includes province-specific time trends and controls for smooth 
trends in any unobserved confounders that vary temporally at the provincial level. This 
conservative method for addressing potential endogeneity barely alters our basic findings, 
although the effect of strong/strong-contender power transitions unsurprisingly decreases. 
Moreover, if we relax our assumption so that the level of corruption follows a linear trend, then 
this model specification can help us control for the effect of corruption level. Finally, we 
calculate the log of our dependent variable to reduce its potential skewness in column (6). The 
result indicates that a strong/strong-contender power transition is associated with an 
approximately 14% increase in the number of investigated officials, which is consistent with our 
baseline findings.  
[Table 4 about here] 
 
            To further test the robustness of our findings, we add more control variables to the 
baseline specification in Table 5. First, we incorporate the lagged dependent variable in the 
regression to check against mean-reverting dynamics. Because the model with the lagged 
dependent variable and province effects yields inconsistent estimates unless the time dimension 
is infinity (Nickel, 1981), we employ the generalized method of moment in column (1) to ensure 
consistency (Arellano & Bond, 1991). To account for the effect of formal institutions on fighting 
corruption, we include “judicial expenditure,” measured as the share of expenses on police, 
procuratorate, court, and judiciary in total government spending, as an imperfect but defensible 
proxy in column (2).11 In addition, drawing on the data set of the 2002 Asian Barometer Survey I 
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(ABSI), we construct two direct measures of corruption, namely local residents’ average 
corruption perception and corruption experience, to further control levels of actual corruption in 
each province. For this test, we consider the period 2002–2012 and treat the 2002 data as the 
initial values of the corruption indicators. In columns (3)–(4), we flexibly interact these two 
variables with year fixed effects as the control variables. This flexible but demanding approach 
enables us to check against time-varying effects of the initial levels of corruption.12 Therefore, 
this strategy can effectively control for the level of corruption by assuming that its change over 
time is a function of its initial level. Finally, as discussed previously, authoritarian leaders may 
launch anticorruption campaigns in response to public dissatisfaction. To account for this 
possibility, we flexibly interact the year dummies with the average political trust of central and 
local governments in 2002, drawn from the ABSI data set, as the control variables in columns 
(5)–(6). Reassuringly, the estimated effect of strong/strong-contender power transition is largely 
unaffected in all regressions in Table 5.  
[Table 5 about here] 
           In addition, to account for province heterogeneity and cross-province correlations in our 
data set, we use panel-corrected standard errors and report the results in Table A3. Table A4 
reports estimation results based on negative binomial models. Unsurprisingly, the results of these 
alternative models are quantitatively similar to those of our baseline regressions. 
 
Role of Personal Characteristics in Fighting Corruption  
           In addition to factional ties, the personal traits of party secretaries may influence their 
incentive to fight corruption. Therefore, we include party secretaries’ level of education, age, 
squared term of age, and years of party membership (columns (1)–(4) of Table 6) in the 
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regressions. We find that the estimated coefficients of strong/strong-contender power transition 
remain significant and stable across the four specifications, whereas none of the personal 
characteristic variables are significant. In addition, we examine the influence of party secretaries’ 
local working experience on anticorruption endeavors. The results in column (5) reveal that local 
working experience per se does not significantly influence anticorruption incentives. Yet, when 
we interact local experience with our key independent variable (strong/strong-contender power 
transition), the estimated coefficient of the interaction term is significantly negative as seen in 
column (6); the joint estimate of strong/strong-contender power transition and the interaction 
term is only 2.6 and insignificant, suggesting that if incumbents from strong factions have 
worked in a particular locality for a long period, they are unlikely to fight corruption 
aggressively, even if their predecessors belong to a competing strong faction. This finding 
further lends credence to our theoretical argument that subnational political leaders fight 
corruption largely to dismantle the political networks of their predecessors and to consolidate 
power. Leaders who have already built their political networks through their career trajectories in 
a locality face few local threats and have low motivation to fight corruption.13 
[Table 6 about here]  
 
Dynamics of Anticorruption 
          Using Equation (2), we examine the dynamic effects of anticorruption. As portrayed in 
Figure 4, prior to Type I power transitions and during the first year of the incumbent’s tenure, no 
increase is seen in the number of investigated officials. In the second year, the number of 
investigated officials increases but the effect is insignificant. From the third year onward, we 
clearly witness a sizable increase in the dependent variable. The coefficients range from 24.2 to 
31.9 and are generally significant. This pattern suggests that even incumbents from strong 
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factions do not attack their competitors and remove established political networks immediately 
after assuming the post, most likely because gaining control of the anticorruption apparatus and 
collecting “smoking gun” corruption evidence may take time. The finding that Type I power 
transitions occur two years before anticorruption campaigns supports our position that local 
anticorruption endeavors are not driven by underlying factors that simultaneously cause both 
power transitions and a surge in the number of investigated officials.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
Ancillary Evidence  
            Thus far, all our analyses considered the number of investigated officials as the dependent 
variable. To further address the primary concern over the accurate measurement of 
anticorruption endeavors, we employ a complementary measurement: local governments’ 
anticorruption propaganda. Local party secretaries tend to use party mouthpieces to rally 
anticorruption campaigns (Manion, 2004). Stronger anticorruption efforts are most likely 
reflected in increased relevant news reports in provincial party newspapers. Therefore, we 
examine anticorruption propaganda to supplement our main analysis. We compile a data set of 
annual counts of provincial party newspaper article titles between 2003 and 2012 containing the 
phrases “corruption” (fubai), “anticorruption” (fanfubai), and “clean government” (lianzheng). In 
addition to these three indicators, we add the indicators to construct a new variable, “all,” to 
capture the overall intensity of the anticorruption propaganda. Because the dependent variable is 
count data and the mean value of these indicators is less than 20, we employ the negative 
binomial model. The results in Table 7 show that while strong/strong-contender power 
transitions cannot account for the instances of “corruption” or “anticorruption,” they are 
associated with a positive and significant increase in the instances of “clean government” and the 
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total number of relevant news articles. The marginal effects suggest that Type I power transitions 
can lead to an annual increase of up to five articles concerning anticorruption propaganda, which 
is equivalent to a 34%–40% increase relative to the mean. Moreover, on testing the effects of 
other types of power transitions, we find that only weak/weak transitions are negatively 
associated with anticorruption propaganda (Table A5).   
[Table 8 about here] 
 
            Figure 5 illustrates the dynamic effect of strong/strong-contender power transitions on 
anticorruption propaganda in newspapers. The estimated effect of Type I power transitions on 
the number of articles titled “clean government” begins to increase in the first year of the 
incumbent’s tenure, but is insignificant at the 5% level. From the second to the fourth year, the 
estimated effects are positive and significant. From the fifth year onward, the effect begins to 
decline (Figure 5A). Similar patterns exist for all three phrases (Figure 5B). The overall trend is 
consistent with our theoretical prediction. We also conduct a placebo test using illegal fund 
(weiji jin’e) audited in total fiscal expenditure. Details of this test and results are available in the 
online appendix (Table A6). 
[Figure 5 about here] 
             In general, we empirically document that strong/strong-contender power transitions are 
associated with higher anticorruption endeavors at the provincial level in China, which is 
reflected not only in the number of investigated officials but also in the intensity of 
anticorruption propaganda. Political leaders with local political networks are found to be unlikely 
to fight corruption, suggesting that anticorruption drives primarily aim to remove the political 
network of rivals and to consolidate power. Our empirical results are robust to various 
specifications and estimation strategies. 
26 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
          The purpose of this study was to understand the motivations behind anticorruption drives 
initiated by authoritarian leaders. We argue that intraelite power competition in authoritarian 
regimes can lead to the politicization of anticorruption just as partisan competition does in 
democracies. Specifically, we find that during provincial leadership turnovers in China, the 
incentive to politicize anticorruption is the strongest when outgoing party secretaries and their 
incumbents belong to competing strong factions, because intraelite power competition tends to 
be the most intense. Thus, as argued by Yang (2004, 250), the motivations behind power 
struggles among political elites in authoritarian regimes “can over time play a role in combating 
corruption similar to that played by interparty competition in political systems with open 
political contestation.” 
 Our research contributes to the understanding of both authoritarian regimes in general 
and corruption control in China. Several scholars have observed that although corruption is 
serious in China, periodic anticorruption campaigns have managed to restrain it (Manion, 2004; 
Wedeman, 2012). However, little research has systematically investigated the mechanism 
encouraging the Chinese government to combat corruption. Without assuming the benevolence 
of either central or provincial government officials, we show that elite power competition along 
factional lines can periodically stimulate intensive corruption investigations. Although such 
anticorruption campaigns tend to be political and selective, they nevertheless maintain corruption 
under a certain level.  
 Broadly, our findings reveal that informal political networks, represented by factional 
infighting within the ruling party, can advance anticorruption movements. This is especially 
germane to nondemocracies, which usually lack effective institutions to guarantee an 
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independent check on corruption (Chang & Golden, 2010). In addition, extant literature offers 
many explanations for why dictators tolerate corruption (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Shirk, 
1993) but provides limited insights into the conditions under which autocrats choose to prosecute 
those involved. Our theoretical framework explains both tolerance and prosecution. Finally, our 
study brings a new perspective to the literature on political cycles. Most research has focused on 
the political impact of leadership turnovers on economic policies in democracies. Our research, 
in line with other recent studies (Berdejó & Yuchtman, 2013; Guo, 2009), indicates that cyclical 
leadership turnovers, regardless of regime type, can influence noneconomic policy areas, such as 
government anticorruption drives. 
  Certain limitations exist in our research. First, our findings may not be generalizable to 
all authoritarian regimes. Future research can offer a nuanced analysis of corruption control 
motivations in autocracies with strong personal dominance and scant institution building. Second, 
we are aware of the influence of the party center on local anticorruption endeavors. We have 
attempted to minimize this influence by controlling time fixed effects to account for 
anticorruption campaigns initiated by the party center as common shocks to all provinces. 
Furthermore, political elites at the party center focus primarily on corruption among high-
ranking officials, which we have accounted for by controlling the Big Case dummy variable. 
Local anticorruption is undeniably influenced more by the party center after Xi Jinping assumed 
power at the end of 2012. He launched a large-scale anticorruption campaign and strongly 
empowered the CDIC by strengthening the central circuit teams’ inspection scope, intensity, and 
frequency (Guo, 2014). However, we notice that the CDIC, headed by Wang Qishan, has 
criticized several times the corruption-condoning attitude of some provincial party secretaries 
and emphasized their ultimate responsibility in supervising local corruption. 14  The critique 
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reveals the substantial amount of autonomy available to local party committees regarding 
anticorruption. The party center’s top-down momentum relies on local leaderships to effectively 
fight corruption. Nevertheless, the logic of anticorruption during Xi’s rule may differ from our 
hypothesis and requires additional studies.  
 Overall, our work presents intraelite power competition as a crucial factor influencing 
anticorruption activities in authoritarian states. Factional infighting may facilitate balancing the 
power among the major political elites and maintaining collective rule in a one-party regime. 
Moreover, institutional development can be conducive to rationalizing elite competition, 
preventing it from devolving into destructive power struggles. However, corruption 
investigations induced by intraelite competition are undeniably biased, arbitrary, and selective. 
Systemic eradication of corruption depends on independent, transparent, and effective 
institutions.  
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Figure 2. Number of investigated officials across provinces, 1996–2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Factional combinations during provincial party secretary power transitions, 1996–
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                Figure 4. Dynamic effect of Type I strong/strong-contender power transition 
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Figure 5. Dynamic effect of Type I strong/strong-contender power transition on newspaper 
anticorruption propaganda 
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Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Number of investigated officials   498 83.03 53.12 1 299 
Big Case 527 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Strong/strong-contender 523 0.21 0.40 0 1 
Same faction 523 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Strong/weak 523 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Weak/strong 523 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Weak/weak 523 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Ln(number of officials) 526 3.46 0.73 1.48 4.68 
SOE size  498 30.66 22.21 3.87 90.27 
Ln(per capita GDP) 527 9.00 0.52 7.88 10.54 
Government size 527 18.75 14.39 5.15 129.10 
Education 526 2.36 0.61 1 4 
Local 526 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Age 526 59.34 4.20 47 70 
Judicial expenditure 525 6.45 1.96 2.30 29.58 
Years of party membership 525 35.47 6.07 17 52 
Share of illegal funds 421 17.33 14.37 0.22 81.28 
Corruption perception 02 28 2.47 0.24 1.76 3.18 
Corruption experience 02 28 0.24 0.09 0.08 0.47 
Trust on central gov02 28 5.56 0.17 5.22 5.85 
Trust on local gov02 28 4.40 0.33 3.39 5.50 
 Corruption (fubai) 403 4.57 4.31 0 24 
 Anticorruption (fanfubai) 403 1.54 2.01 0 10 
Clean government (lianzheng) 403 9.79 10.74 0 78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Baseline results for the effect of Type I strong/strong-contender power transition 
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 Dependent variable: Number of investigated officials 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Strong/Strong-Contender 13.107** 16.376*** 17.341*** 16.168*** 
 (5.643) (4.894) (5.414) (5.533) 
 
Ln(number of officials) 
  
10.660 
 
13.763 
 
8.736 
  (33.599) (36.873) (37.796) 
 
Ln(per capita GDP) 
  
50.848*** 
 
52.651*** 
 
53.525*** 
  (17.088) (18.545) (18.092) 
 
Government size 
   
−0.001 
 
0.065 
   (0.363) (0.352) 
 
SOE size 
   
0.025 
 
0.015 
   (0.159) (0.162) 
 
Big Case(t) 
    
9.558* 
    (5.422) 
 
Big Case(t+1) 
    
7.139 
    (5.449) 
 
Big Case(t+2) 
    
−0.854 
    (3.806) 
     
Observations 495 495 471 471 
Number of provinces 31 31 31 31 
Adjusted R-squared 0.086 0.112 0.116 0.126 
Province FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level shown in parentheses. 
***Significance at 1% **Significance at 5% *Significance at 10% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Effect of other power transition types 
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  Same faction  Strong/weak Weak/strong Weak/weak 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Power transition −10.401 −15.098** 0.888 −0.267 −1.098 0.368 −4.448 −4.401 
 
(8.205) (7.385) (4.192) (3.830) (4.488) (4.742) (6.168) (6.764) 
   
    
  Observations 498 474 495 471 495 471 495 471 
Number of 
provinces 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.084 0.124 0.063 0.094 0.063 0.094 0.066 0.096 
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Baseline controls  NO YES NO  YES NO  YES NO  YES 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level shown in parentheses. Baseline controls include all 
control variables specified in the column (6) of Table 3. ***Significance at 1% **Significance at 5% *Significance 
at 10% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Robustness checks I 
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Excluding 
central-direct-
administered 
municipalities 
Excluding 
Tibet and 
Xinjiang 
Period 
2002–
2012 
With 
region × 
year FE 
With 
province-
specific 
time trend 
DV: 
Ln(corruption) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Strong/Strong-
Contender 15.323** 17.077*** 15.577** 17.371** 13.076** 0.143*** 
 
(6.679) (5.598) (7.351) (6.361) (5.903) (0.043) 
       Observations 410 442 299 471 471 471 
Number of provinces 27 29 31 31 31 31 
Adjusted R-squared 0.112 0.135 0.128 0.108 0.330 0.168 
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Baseline controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level shown in parentheses. The dependent variable in 
columns (1)–(5) is the number of investigated officials. ***Significance at 1% **Significance at 5% *Significance 
at 10% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Robustness check II 
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  Dependent variable: number of investigated officials 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Strong/Strong-Contender 15.865*** 16.346*** 14.675* 16.618** 17.177** 16.773** 
 
(5.342) (5.582) (7.403) (7.954) (7.878) (7.338) 
Corruption(t-1) 0.325*** 
     
 
(0.051) 
     
Judicial expenditure 
 
0.146 
    
  
(0.857) 
    
       Corruption perception 02 × Year FE 
  
YES 
   
       Corruption experience 02 × Year FE 
   
YES 
  
       Trust on central gov02 × Year FE 
    
YES 
 
       Trust on local gov02 × Year FE 
     
YES 
       
       Observations 448 470 273 273 273 273 
Number of provinces 31 31 28 28 28 28 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.128 0.163 0.140 0.125 0.153 
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Baseline controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level shown in parentheses.  
***Significance at 1% **Significance at 5% *Significance at 10% 
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Table 6. Personal characteristics and anticorruption endeavors 
 
  Dependent variable: number of investigated officials 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Strong/Strong-Contender 16.193*** 17.360*** 17.588*** 16.189*** 16.356** 21.274*** 
 
(5.552) (5.817) (6.016) (5.547) (5.949) (7.366) 
Education −0.897 
     
 
(3.752) 
     Age 
 
0.718 −4.501 
   
  
(0.562) (11.916) 
   
Age2 
  
0.045 
   
   
(0.104) 
   
Years of party membership 
   
0.058 
  
    
(0.466) 
  
Local  
    
0.865 3.439 
     
(4.842) (5.689) 
Local × strong/strong-
contender 
     
−18.673* 
      
(9.926) 
Strong/strong 
     
2.601 
 + (local × strong/strong) 
     
(6.435) 
 
Observations 471 471 471 470 471 471 
Number of provinces 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Adjusted R-squared 0.124 0.133 0.132 0.123 0.124 0.131 
Province FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Baseline controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level shown in parentheses. ***Significance at 1% 
**Significance at 5% *Significance at 10% 
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Table 7. Effect of Type I strong/strong-contender power transition on anticorruption propaganda 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
     Fubai 
(corruption) 
Fanfubai 
(anticorruption) 
Lianzheng 
(clean 
government) All  
          
Strong /Strong-Contender 0.094 0.107 0.342** 0.298** 
 
(0.149) (0.204) (0.159) (0.137) 
Marginal effects 0.531 0.195 4.804** 5.378** 
 
(0.856) (0.383) (2.430) (2.634) 
Ln(number of officials) −0.954 −0.645 −2.898** −2.296* 
 
(1.186) (1.734) (1.393) (1.268) 
Ln(per capita GDP) 1.211*** 1.498* 1.023 0.967** 
 
(0.467) (0.810) (0.628) (0.459) 
Big Case(t) 0.298*** 0.272 0.315*** 0.320*** 
 
(0.097) (0.181) (0.091) (0.085) 
Big Case(t+1) 0.171 0.173 0.145 0.197* 
 
(0.113) (0.184) (0.102) (0.104) 
Big Case(t+2) 0.126 0.190 0.109 0.119 
 
(0.111) (0.126) (0.122) (0.115) 
     Observations 310 310 310 310 
Number of provinces 31 31 31 31 
Province FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
 
 Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level shown in parentheses. Marginal effects of 
strong/strong-contender power transition are calculated using finite difference method. The overdispersion 
parameter α in all specifications significantly differs from zero. ***Significance at 1% **Significance at 5% 
*Significance at 10% 
 
 
 
Notes 
1. “CDIC receives surging numbers of corruption reports: letters to some province increased 
from a few hundred to three thousand every month,” 
http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1315056 accessed 9 June 2015 
2.    Consensus building among the top echelon of leadership is greatly emphasized in post-Mao 
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China, particularly on the decision making of elite politics. A single powerful leader or 
faction cannot dictate on personnel appointment (e.g. Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988; Shirk, 
1993). 
3.   For example, Zhou Yongkang, a corrupt former PSC member “helicoptered” several local 
officials to key positions in Sichuan when being the provincial party secretary and often 
inspected Sichuan after his promotion. These measures, in addition to his status as the 
secretary of the central political-legal committee, facilitated preserving his personal 
networks within Sichuan. Zhou’s power network undoubtedly formed an obstacle for his 
successor, Zhang Xuezhong, a follower of Hu Jintao. Zhang called for active anticorruption 
efforts after he became the party secretary of Sichuan. 
4.   It is worth pointing out that assigning Bo to an interior city like Chongqing was mainly to 
move him out of Beijing and reduce his influence and power, rather than to send him to fight 
corruption in Chongqing. Reportedly, Wu Yi, the former vice premier, disliked Bo for his 
arrogance. She retired without seeking any honorary post to exchange for not naming Bo, 
who was commerce minister at that time, as her successor.  Bo’s case also reflects that 
personnel decisions are often the results of contingent factors and compromise between 
different factions.  
5.    An analogous example is that Zeng Qinghong attempted to compete for PRC president with 
Hu Jingtao in 2007. Hu ordered the CDIC to investigate corruption offences of Zeng’s son in 
exchange for Zeng’s ultimate withdraw (Guo, 2014).   
6.    Investigation data of provincial procuratorates appeared in Procuratorate Statistical 
Yearbooks from 1986. However, data before 1996 have many missing values. 
7.   We double-check our coding by using biographies of provincial leaders and other publicly 
available sources, such as the Connected China Database (http://china.fathom.info/). Two 
researchers independently coded the factional ties of provincial leaders and reconciled the 
discrepancies to ensure intercoder reliability.    
8.   Faction details are available on request to the authors. Empirically, even if we treat 
princelings as one faction, our findings will be unaffected and could even be strengthened. 
Results are available on request.   
9.   We further examine the extent to which omitted variables, such as corruption level, may 
affect our findings according to the insight that the bias from observed controls is 
informative about the bias from unobserved controls (Altonji, Elder, & Taber, 2005). We 
consider the model in column 1 of Table 2 a restricted model and that in column 4 of Table 2 
a full model. The lower bound on the true coefficient can be calculated as: 
. The lower bound of our estimated effect is: 16.168 –
 |(13.107-16.168)| = 13.107. Following the approach of Bellows and Miguel (2009), we 
calculate the ratio of the estimated coefficient of the restricted model to the difference in the 
estimated coefficients between the restricted model and full model. The ratio is 4.28, 
suggesting that the relationship between the omitted variables and our dependent variable 
must be more than fourfold stronger to explain the entire effect we have identified. Given 
that we have accounted for various potential confounding variables including fixed effects, 
omitted variable bias is unlikely to affect our results. 
10.   The regions are east, north, south, central, northwest, southwest, and northeast China.  
11. We are aware that introducing this variable to the regression may produce potential 
 
42 
 
 
posttreatment bias; we control for the consequences of the treatment variable (e.g., Angrist 
& Pischke, 2009; King, 2010). 
12.  Because we have the direct measure of corruption of only 2002, we include this variable in 
the robustness check rather than the major regressions. 
13.  We test the effect of the personal characteristics of provincial governors and their 
relationship with party secretaries (i.e., whether they are from competing factions) and fail 
to find consistent and robust results. Regression results are available upon request. 
14. “Problems in anticorruption is first attributed to the party secretary”, 
http://xmwb.news365.com.cn/zg/201409/t20140902_1263454.html, accessed 23 May 2015. 
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